Abstract: This study investigates the political economy of policy processes surrounding the response to Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) in Cambodia, identifying key actors, networks, associated narratives and practices of policy. With the emergence and spread of HPAI in Cambodia in 2004, international donors and governments intervened in their self-interest in supplying foreign aid in order to control the outbreak as an emergency response to a global health threat. Although the outbreak subsided in 2007 with the assistance of foreign aid, the livelihood of those affected was inadequately addressed. Because 90 per cent of Cambodian poultry is raised in backyards, almost anything achieved with poultry (or livestock) can be considered pro-poor, but this, regrettably, is not of particular interest do donors.
INTRODUCTION
In 2003 outbreaks of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (Influenza A subtype H5N1) in animals and humans from China and Vietnam prompted a global public health response that varied widely depending on individual nations' resources, health infrastructure and politics. On the one hand, China's government was criticized for its silence over Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and hesitancy to share data on and samples of A/H5N1 (Nature, 2006) , while the United Nations and countries such as Thailand reacted more openly. For Cambodia, HPAI was discovered in January 2004 in poultry on a farm outside Phnom Penh. Cambodia's experience with HPAI reveals important aspects of how a developing country with limited resources and capabilities responded to a crisis with global public health implications and how the global response in turn affected Cambodia. Already awash in donor money , 2 Cambodia played its role on a global policy stage by clamoring for its share of the HPAI pie and by becoming an incubator for donor trial-and-error experiments on how to minimize the risk of HPAI's spread inside Cambodia and more importantly, how to reduce potential pandemics from striking donor countries themselves . 3 A key turning point in shifting the focus from animal health to human health took place in January 2005 with the discovery of Cambodia's first confirmed victim, not in Cambodia, but in Vietnam. This led to the publication of news accounts critical of Cambodia's notoriously weak health infrastructure, or lack thereof. Indeed, a one page What seems immediately apparent in Cambodia's 18 February 2005 story in Science, the magazine of the political economy of HPAI is the numerous external American Association for the Advancement of Science, actors involved in a country of only 14 million people. entitled 'First Human Case in Cambodia Highlights
Since the UN-managed elections in 1993, which brought Surveillance Shortcomings' warned that 'The diagnosis in a plethora of NGOs, Cambodia's political terrain has was made not in Cambodia but in neighboring Vietnam, been transformed. Most obviously, the international where the 25-year-old woman had sought treatment and community provided billions in development aid. At least died on 30 January,' adding that 'the woman's 14-yearin part, aid was utilized by the governing Cambodian old brother had died earlier of an apparent respiratory People's Party to consolidate its control over the rural disease now suspected to be H5N1, but his remains were cremated before any samples were taken'. Moreover, Cambodia relies heavily on donors (in the recent past, more than half the country's budget came from aid), making it an important case study for aid effectiveness. Examining donor and government interventions and interactions in the realm of HPAI control further sharpens the blunt instrument that i s simply foreign aid into one specific aspect of a n emergency response to a global health threat. political economy of HPAI. The private sector, a s Local o wnership is a serious problem not just i n represented by conglomerates like Charoen Pokphand Cambodia but in all of the developing world and a donor-(CP) Cambodia, is also not represented because of the driven agenda can sometimes result in "wag the dog" opacity of its operations in Cambodia. effects where the government nominally leads b y This paper uses a qualitative research methodology 'chairing' a committee or thematic working group, but consisting of mostly one-on-one semi-structured donors are in fact calling the shots. Moreover, more than interviews across government, the private sector and the 160 NGOs have had HPAI-related activities i n non-governmental sector. These include, but are not Cambodia. While it is not possible to map the 160+ limited to: government officials, donor and NGO NGOs, Fig. 1 shows the Node Degree (defined as the representatives, the private sector (including number of physical links per node) ranking of different conglomerates, farmers and wet market stallholders) actors involved in HPAI interventions. The blue dots and civil society representatives. These interviews were (black in grayscale) represent country governments, conducted over the course of three visits to Cambodia in while the red dots (dark in grayscale) represent local total. NGOs. Most notably, while dozens of local NGOs were More than 40 face-to-face interviews were conducted in engaged in HPAI activities at some point, only two Khmer, French and English primarily in Phnom Penh remain in this map and one, MEDiCAM, actually had and the environs, but with one site visit to the province of received no commitment of funding as of the matrix's Kampong Som. A visit to Phnom Penh's Psah Orussey, creation and as determined by an interview with a where a wet market is located, was also made to gain representative of the organization in early June 2008.
MATERIALS AND METHODS

Fig
an appreciation for conditions on the ground. The author The situation is not known to have changed since then.
was not well received when photographing the wet It is immediately apparent that the US government has market and sternly warned "not to spread false stories in taken a very active role in funding HPAI activities using newspapers" by a wet market seller. Average interviews the United States Agency for International Development lasted anywhere from 45 min to hours (if over a meal (USAID) and US-CDC. Both organizations enjoy six links typically). Information from informants used in this paper or node degrees, more than any other entity mapped.
is coded numerically (1 through 40+) to protect identities and a complete list is shown in Appendix 1. The number contrast, only saw 33% of respondents agreeing or in parenthesis following that informant's title descriptor appears t o the left in the list of informants and i s randomly assigned. Given the sheer number of actors engaged in HPAI control activities in Cambodia, it was impractical t o obtain input from, much less interview even a majority of these actors. This includes for instance the Ministry of Health's Communicable Diseases Control Department, which is incharge of surveillance of human diseases; USAID, which was able to fund a number of activities in 2005 because of leftover (unspent) 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Respondents were asked to rate a series of statements and to add written comments to their ratings. As will become apparent, with respect to Avian Influenza, greater government-donor coordination is needed t o align national and international interests. A majority of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the R oyal Government of Cambodia intervened effectively and appropriately, given resource allocations, in humans, animals and pandemic preparedness (56%, 54% and 60%, respectively). Protecting livelihoods, in mostly agreeing. Clearly, protecting livelihoods was rated by those deeply involved in Avian Influenza interventions to have been shaky at best. While one respondent (1) felt the damage to livelihoods was limited because of the short duration of outbreaks, others were left totally unimpressed: 'Nothing is done to take [care] of the livelihoods of the smallholders' (6) and 'No specific livelihoods intervention that I am aware of. In fact, there is no record of any discussions o n compensation for loss of poultry in the event o f outbreak.' This was not the only criticism. Among humans, one informant claimed that 'Instances o f suspected [cases were] not being investigated' (17). Indeed, some of the written comments in the area of protecting livelihoods were among the harshest . There 7 was remarkable contrast between MAFF and MoH effectiveness. In c ontrast, donors were somewhat more positively viewed in terms of effectiveness in HPAI interventions among humans and animals than the Royal Government of Cambodia (77% and 67%, respectively rated as agree or strongly agree). Not surprisingly, donors were also dismally rated on protecting livelihoods, with only 38% of respondents agreeing and none strongly agreeing that donors had effectively and appropriately intervened, given resource allocations. More surprisingly, only 43% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that donors were effective in pandemic preparedness interventions. Overall, respondents conveyed differences in effectiveness both within government and among donors and NGOs. It seems apparent that if donor interventions reflect government performance, the absence of a compensation policy is not seen as a failing of the donor community's response in protecting livelihoods. This may represent a silenced narrative for the lack o f willingness by respondents (again, mostly self-selected from the donor community) to take a hard look a t themselves in the mirror. Protecting livelihoods cannot be assumed. Responses suggest neither government nor donors were particularly effective in this area. 
Conclusion:
The overall analysis reveals key challenges, ourresearch/avianflu.html, a core project within the obstacles and opportunities for responding to Avian Influenza and potentially other global epidemics. For example, one of the reasons given for noncompensation revealed the tremendous amount o f confusion there was about its effectiveness. How effective is compensation when used elsewhere and more importantly, in countries neighboring Cambodia? What we have learned about the bureaucratic politics of the country in light of Avian Influenza has been the need to i ncrease the credibility of MAFF as a partner b y building its technical capacity and financial management . In some ways, MoH's "success" has 8 been path-dependent. History determines the future in this sense because money has been directed at MoH and s o good financial management begets more money. At the same time, the issue of livelihoods main streaming for HPAI policy was laid bare. Protecting livelihoods should not be assumed, but made explicit in the form of "pro-poor HPAI risk reduction". On a more specific level, building effective surveillance systems cannot be an exclusively technical exercise; sending equipment and reagents to Cambodia, training lab staff in their use on study tours, etc., is necessary but not sufficient. Capacity building can take decades; using volunteer lab staff from overseas might be an effective intermediate solution to bridge the gap until reform of the country's civil service and political economy takes place. To begin and further reform efforts, donors and the RGC need to align interests better. Donors need to impose greater self-discipline; instead of funding ghost labs all over the country (a problem of quantity), donors need to focus on quality (make fewer labs function properly). The implications for the global health situation and international relations are enormous. Maintaining the status quo means playing Russian roulette with global public health. Appendix: The below titles have been generalized to prevent identification of informants. For example, several informants were heads of trade associations, which would make their identities obvious. Also, government officials do not have their ministries listed for the same reason. The number in parenthesis following that informant's title descriptor throughout the text now appears to the left of the below list and is randomly assigned. The views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the US Government. In 2006, aid was 7.6% of Gross National Income, a relative decline from previous years which from 1993-2006 averaged nearly 11%. completed responses were received. The survey contained 14 questions, requesting that respondents rate the effectiveness of government and donors, respectively, on a Likert scale, as well as provide written responses where appropriate. Of the respondents, 59% (10) had 1-3 years experience, 24% (4) had 4-6 months experience and 18% (3) had less than three months 6 experience working on HPAI in Cambodia. The capacity in which these individuals worked on HPAI ranged widely because cross-listing was permitted: human health (24%); animal health (16%); disaster management (24%); livelihoods (4%); wildlife (8%) and 'Other' (24%). This other category included six written responses: (1) Risk reduction and capacity building at the village level (animal and human health); (2) combining animal health and livelihoods impacts; (3) UN agency; (4) Communication for transmission risk reduction; (5) Communication and (6) AHI Coordination incorporating all of the above. Respondents worked in a wide variety of areas related to HPAI control activities, including wildlife. Overwhelmingly, respondents were 'Donor Agency or Foreign Government (Bilat/Multi/UN, etc.)' (65%), to a much lesser extent the international NGO community (24%), For-Profit Private Corporation (6%) and 'Other, Please specify' (12%). The survey focused on perceptions of effectiveness of the HPAI response. 'Nothing is done to take [care] of the livelihoods of the smallholders' (6); 'I am one of the population in Cambodia and I do not hear 7 about the Govt. strategy for responding to AI' (10) and 'No specific livelihoods intervention that I am aware of. In fact, there is no record of any discussions on compensation for loss of poultry in the event of outbreak ' (17) . Underscoring the weakness in Cambodia's statistical knowledgebase, participants of a Workshop on Avian Influenza Research Activities 8 in Cambodia that took place 8-9 October 2008 in Sihanoukville underscored "(i) the urgent need for a livestock/agricultural census to obtain current figures on livestock numbers and production in Cambodia; (ii) the lack of information authorities have on cross-border movements of p oultry and poultry products and how these could be estimated through indirect assessments and (iii) the need t o 'benchmark' the sensitivity of the current surveillance activities and to test the surveillance and response system by conducting simulation exercises" (Otte and Ronald-Holst, 2008 
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